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Abstract The Netherlands has been internationally known for its multicultural
approach to immigrant integration. The aim of this article is to delve into the
“coproduction” by researchers and policy makers of this so-called Dutch
“multicultural model”. As this article shows, researchers and policy makers have
in The Netherlands been joined in several discourse coalitions. Indeed, one of these
discourse coalitions supported an integration paradigm with multicultural elements,
but at least two other types of discourses can be identified in The Netherlands, one of
more liberal–egalitarian nature and one more assimilationist. In spite of the persistent
image of The Netherlands as a representative of the multicultural model, it is in fact
this multiplicity of discourses that characterizes the Dutch case. Moreover, labeling
Dutch integration policies as “multiculturalist” has to be understood as a
performative act by both politicians and scholars who disapprove of Dutch
integration policies. In that sense, the retrospective labeling of policies as
multiculturalist is a very specific kind of coproduction of a policy frame.
Keywords Immigrant integration policies . Multiculturalism .
National models of integration . Research-policy dialogues . Policy frames
Mots clés Les politiques d'intégration des immigrées . Multiculturalisme
(communitaurisme) . Les models nationaux d'intégration
The Netherlands has been internationally known for its multicultural approach to
immigrant integration. Some even speak of a “multicultural model” that would
continue to inform Dutch political discourse and policy practices until this very day
(Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Joppke 2007; Koopmans 2007). The basic
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premise of this model would be that Dutch policies have been driven by a coherent
and consistent belief that the recognition and accommodation of cultural, ethnic, and
religious groups in society will lead to their successful emancipation into the Dutch
multicultural society.
The genesis of this Dutch multicultural model is said to have been influenced
greatly by academic researchers and scientific experts in The Netherlands. Among
researchers involved in this field, there would have been a strong belief in the so-
called multicultural model. Rath (2001) speaks in this context of an “ethnic
minorities paradigm” in Dutch research. Furthermore, researchers in this field would
have been strongly policy-oriented and even entwined in policy networks.
Guiraudon (1997) and Rath (2001) speak in this context of a “technocratic
symbiosis” that that enabled the development “behind gilded doors” of a
multicultural policy approach, while ignoring several alternative policy paradigms.
Yet, there is growing doubt about whether the “multicultural model” has been or
at least continues to be a valid depiction of the Dutch approach to immigrant
integration (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2009; Scholten 2011). The multicultural model
seems to have been coined retrospectively, in an attempt by politicians to disqualify
policies they disagree with. These politicians are helped in their framing effort by
some social scientists who claim that there is evidence that, when it comes to
concrete policy practices, some measures reflect the Dutch multicultural model
(Koopmans 2007). When it comes to policy practices on the local level, it is
contested, however, whether these policy practices are actually driven by a
normative multicultural model or by more pragmatic concerns of “keeping things
together” (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008).
The aim of this article is to delve into the social construction, or as we will
describe it, the “coproduction” by researchers and policy makers of the so-called
Dutch multicultural model and other policy discourses regarding integration. Based
on neo-institutionalist literature, a framework will be developed that accounts for the
dynamic nature of policy discourses and the role of the research-policy nexus in
constructing these dominant frames. Whereas (rational and historical) institutionalist
literature tends to accept the role of scientific research in policy-making as given
(“science speaking truth to power”), neo-institutionalists focus on the more dynamic
ways in which actors operate within the fields of research and policy. Our analysis is
based on a rigorous review of policy documents and academic literature on
immigrant integration in The Netherlands. A detailed analysis was conducted of
these sources in order to reveal the frames and discourses that have emerged in
policy and research over the past decades. Moreover, we charted the networks—
including both politicians and social scientists—that developed over time, co-producing
policy frames.
The empirical analysis in this article is limited to the Dutch case. However, we
consider the processes that are revealed in this paper, especially in terms of the
coproduction of specific integration frames by researchers and policymakers, as
relevant to other countries as well. In fact, other researchers have also questioned the
dominant position of specific national models of integration in countries as France
and Great Britain (Bertossi 2009; Favell 1998, 2001). This article specifically
contributes to a better understanding of the genesis of these alleged national models
of integration and the role of migration research therein.
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The research-policy nexus and the construction of “policy models”
The construction of (national) models of integration
The idea of “national models of integration”, inspired by institutionalist thinking, has
acquired great resonance in European migration research. Institutionalists focus on
which models or regimes are considered rational within specific institutional settings
(rational choice) or which models are legacies from the history of a specific country
(historical institutionalism). A key trait of these policy models is that they are
expected to be relatively stable over fairly long periods of time, based on the
assumption that the conditions that led to a specific model are unlikely to change
rapidly and that models themselves tend to develop a certain path-dependency or
resistance to change.
This models-thinking has become prominent in comparative studies of migration
policies as well as to self-referential discourse within specific countries about
immigrant integration. For instance, studies of France have focused on its so-called
“Republican model” of integration, which is orientated at the assimilation of
migrants into the French political and cultural community. In fact, within France, this
model played an important role in structuring research-policy relations; there were
public intellectuals that strongly supported this model (Favell 1998). However, this
model also sustained a taboo on gathering statistics on ethnic groups that would be at
odds with the color-blind premises of the model (Simon and Amiraux 2006).
A key reference in this models-thinking is Brubaker’s (1992) Citizenship and
nationhood in France and Germany. In this book, Brubaker juxtaposes the German
and French models of citizenship that provided the foundations for the integration
policies in these countries; a differentialist approach in Germany and an
assimilationist approach in France. Whereas the Germans stressed exclusive
membership of the German community based on ethnic ties (ius sanguinis), the
French adopted a more inclusive model oriented at inclusion into full citizenship of
everyone born on French soil (ius soli). As a true historical institutionalist, Brubaker
shows how the historical conditions in both countries that led to the construction of
these national models: a strongly developed cultural and apolitical sense of national
belonging in Germany versus the state-centric tradition of nation building in France.
In addition, the work of Christian Joppke takes national models as starting point
for comparative studies of immigrant integration as well (1995). Also, his recent
work (2007) where he claims on a convergence of national policies is based on the
idea that countries originally started out with national models. Or Patrick Ireland
(1994) who, in a comparative study of France and Switzerland, found that national
institutional conditions provide the best explanation for the type of policies that are
developed. Or Ruud Koopmans (2007) who in his Dutch–German comparison takes
the differences in national models as the main explanation for the differences in
effectiveness of the Dutch and German approaches.
One of the reasons why models have gained such wide resonance in migration
studies (as in various other sectors) is that they help reducing complexity: it
simplifies the otherwise highly complex and contested matter of immigrant
integration. Models help to construct international comparative studies to assess
processes of convergence or divergence between various European countries.
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Furthermore, by comparing ideal–typical models with specific periods, modeling can
generate insight in a country's history. In this latter sense, Castles and Miller (2003)
and in their footsteps, Koopmans et al. (2005), have extended Brubaker's dichotomy
into a fourfold typology of integration models; civic-assimilationism, cultural
pluralism, ethnic-differentialism, and civic-republicanism. An important difference
with the historical institutionalist modeling of Brubaker is that this fourfold
distinction of integration models represents ideal-types that can be used for studying
country cases, rather than that these models are taken as representative for national
approaches per se.
The danger of modeling is that the models are not only taken as tools for
international comparison or for understanding historical periods. When a model
begins to shape our understanding and beliefs about policies, the model becomes
more than just a model: the model is then taken as an accurate historical
reconstruction of policy rather than as a model of it. Models then take the place of
historical analysis. In social science literature, this has often led instances where a
model is “blamed” for the success or failure of a specific policy approach. For
instance, various authors have blamed the Dutch multicultural model for the alleged
failure of immigrant integration in The Netherlands (Koopmans 2003; Sniderman
and Hagendoorn 2007).
In addition, models tend to oversimplify policies and overstress the alleged
coherency and consistency of these policies (Bowen 2007; Bertossi and Duyvendak
2009). Policy practices tend to be far more resilient and diverse than most policy
models would suggest. For instance, in Dutch as well as in French literature, there
have been many references to differences between how policies are formulated on
the national level and how they are put into practice often on the local level; some
even speak of the decoupling of national and local policies in this respect (Favell
1998; De Zwart 2005; Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). In fact, even when policy
makers claim to operate according to a specific policy model, their reasons for doing
so may be more pragmatic and flexible, then in the policy model itself, in its ideal–
typical form. For instance, the reason why some politicians in the 1980s framed
immigrant integration in terms of the multicultural model may have much more to do
with their fear of anti-immigrant parties playing the race card than with their so-called
multicultural policy beliefs (Penninx 1988; Scholten 2011).
However, models can be very powerful as a form of policy discourse (Hajer
1995). A model is not just about being valid, but also about being conceptually and
normatively clear and convincing. A model helps making sense out of the complex
social reality that is often associated with issues as immigrant integration, they are
tools for “naming” and “framing” the problem and determining adequate paths for
policy action. Hajer speaks in this context of the formation of discourse coalitions
which are actors that are held together by a shared discourse and not necessarily by
coordinated interaction. This can include various types of actors, including
politicians and policy makers, as well as academics, experts, interest groups,
journalists, etc.
Once a discourse becomes dominant and is supported by a sufficiently large or
strong group of actors, a discourse can prove difficult to change. Challenging a
discourse means also challenging the beliefs and interests of the groups involved in
the discourse coalition. Furthermore, discourses tend to become taken-for-granted:
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even members of a discourse coalition may be unaware of their tacit beliefs and the
presence of alternative beliefs. This is why, according to Rein and Schön (1994),
situations that are characterized by a multiplicity of coexisting discourses (or
“frames”) tend to evolve in intractable policy controversies. Such intractable
controversies do not just involve mere disagreements about how to resolve a given
problem, but fundamental differences in the naming and framing of a problem. Such
controversies cannot be resolved by merely studying “the facts”, as discourse
coalitions will have very different ways of selecting and interpreting these facts.
Hence, intractable controversies would only be resolvable by reflecting on the
deeper conceptual and normative premises that underlie a specific discourse (what
Rein and Schön describe as frame reflection). This means that actors have to become
aware of their own models or “frames”, have to be able to put themselves in the
shoes of actors with other frames and have to be willing to adapt their discourses
when required.
In the case of migration studies, this means that national models of immigrant
integration should not be taken-for-granted. Rather, these models should be
taken as object of analysis rather than as a starting point for analysis. The
deductive evaluation of a model's success or failure would, from this perspective,
probably not lead to the resolution of policy controversy, but the inductive
analysis of the deeper premises of a policy may contribute to such critical
reflection.
Research-policy dialogues
The objective of this article is to analyze the role of social-scientific research in the
construction of the alleged Dutch multicultural model of integration and assess to
what extent research has been able to contribute to “critical reflection” on this model.
The standard model of the relation between social research and policy-making is one
of “science speaking truth to power” (Wildavsky 1979). Indeed, as Radin (2000)
shows, many of the social sciences evolved with a strong policy orientation and
resolve to contribute to rational societal steering. This certainly applies to migration
research which, as Favell (1998) shows, evolved in a clear parallel to emerging
policy concerns about immigrant integration.
Yet, particularly when it comes to intractable policy controversies like
immigrant integration, this standard model of speaking truth to power becomes
difficult to maintain. What goes as truth tends to be inherently contested in
situations where there are multiple discourses, each with their own way of
naming and framing the problem, and their own way of selecting and interpreting
evidence. Without notion of different underlying discourses, research-policy
dialogues can in such situations decay in “dialogues of the deaf” (Van Eeten
1999).
Furthermore, researchers often do more than just present evidence to policy
makers. Academics and experts are then part of specific discourse coalitions
themselves. The formation of such discourse coalitions is often referred to as a
key factor in the “co-evolution” (Nowotny et al. 2001) or “coproduction” of truth-
claims by researchers and policy makers. In this context, Nowotny et al. (2001:
245) refer to the growing transgression of science-politics boundaries and the
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contextualisation of science, which means that science not only speaks to society
but society also speaks back to science. According to Shapin and Shaffer (1985:
332), there is a “conditional relationship between the nature of the polity occupied
by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity”. Ezrahi (1990) has
described the rise of modern science in relation to the increasing demand by
modern societies as instrumental means to sustain administrative control; science
would have been an important political resource for depersonalizing and
depoliticizing ideological state control and thereby legitimizing modern liberal
democratic politics.
Bourdieu has conceptualized this interaction between researchers and policy
makers in terms of a conversion of scientific capital to other sorts of capital, such as
economic, social, or cultural capital (Bourdieu 1975: 25), as well as other sorts of
symbolic capital (Bourdieu 2004: 55). For instance, besides “strictly scientific
authority”, there would also be a sort of scientific capital that is more related to other
sorts of capital, or a sort of capital that involves “power over the scientific world
which can be accumulated through channels that are not purely scientific (...) and
which is the bureaucratic principle of temporal powers over the scientific field such
as those of ministers and ministries, deans and vice chancellors or scientific
administrators” (2004: 57).
Thus, the fields of research and policy cannot be seen as essentially demarcated.
Instead, they can best be conceptualized as interconnected in their development.
Following Bourdieu's conceptualization of science-politics relations, it is likely that
the conversion of capital between both fields will produce specific shared discourses
(such as national models of integration). In other words, the interaction between
fields tends to reinforce the coproduction of truth or knowledge claims. For instance,
the type of knowledge claims that are developed by researchers will also depend on
the sorts of capital that can be obtained with these claims, in terms of economic
capital (e.g., research funding), but also social capital (e.g., networks) and cultural
capital (e.g., authority, influence).
Bourdieu's conceptualization of research-policy relations and its implications for
the coproduction of knowledge seems to support Rein and Schön's skepticism
about the resolution of intractable policy controversies by studying the (scientific)
facts. Researchers tend to be part of discourse coalitions rather than having the
critical distance required for “critical frame reflection.” In fact, this has led many
policy scientists to be very cynical about the possibilities for “policy learning” or
“social learning”. According to Hall (1993), social learning will mostly take place
on the level of secondary or tertiary policy facets, but rarely on the first level of
fundamental policy assumptions. Similarly, Sabatier (1987) prospects that
fundamental policy change due to learning is as unlikely as religious conversion
and that such policy changes are more likely to be due to external perturbations
like shifts in political power, large-scale focus events, or macro-economic
perturbations.
In the following parts of this article, we will first reconstruct the claim that The
Netherlands has known a multicultural model of integration. Secondly, we will
examine the role of researchers in the framing of Dutch policies as “multicultural”—but
we also look at the role of politicians and scholars in the coproduction of other policy
frames regarding integration.
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“The Dutch multicultural model” and other public discourses on integration
For the analysis of the role of social research in the construction of the so-called
Dutch multicultural model of immigrant integration, the first step will be to
reconstruct what is meant by a multicultural model by researchers using this term,
followed by an assessment of the validity of their empirical claim that The
Netherlands has developed multicultural policies on the basis of a multicultural
model (does policy indeed follow this model, has the model been consistent and
coherent, does the model also inform policy practices?).
How the “multicultural model” was invented by sociologists
A key trait of the Dutch multicultural model would be, according to some
colleagues, its tendency to institutionalize cultural pluralism in the belief that
cultural emancipation of immigrant minorities is the key to their integration into
Dutch society (see also Duyvendak and Scholten 2009). This would also reflect a
rather uncontested acceptation of the transformation of Dutch society into a
multicultural society. In the latter respect, a connection is often made with the
peculiar Dutch history of pillarisation, referring to the period from the 1920s to
1960s when most of Dutch society was structured according to specific religious
(protestant, Catholic) or socio-cultural (socialist, liberal) pillars (Lijphart 1968).
A recent study by Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), When Ways of Life
Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents in The Netherlands, explicitly labels
the Dutch approach in terms of a multiculturalist model. The authors claim that the
labeling of collective identities has inadvertently deepened social-cultural cleavages
in society rather than bridging these differences. They take The Netherlands as their
single exemplary case to found their claims. They root the Dutch approach back to
the history of pillarisation: “The Netherlands has always been a country of minorities
thanks to the power of religion to divide as well as unite” (pp. 13). In addition, the
“collective trauma of World War II where the Dutch failed to resist the massive
deportation of Jews would have contributed to that immigrant minorities have been
seen in the light of the Holocaust (..) or that critical views of immigrants are labeled
racist and xenophobic.” Due to these historical circumstances, a multiculturalist
model would have taken root in The Netherlands.
The German sociologist Joppke also considers the Dutch as the most radical
exponent of the multiculturalist model. He describes how recently the Dutch
changed their policies, since the alleged multicultural policies have been a failure:
“Civic integration is a response to the obvious failure of one of Europe's most
pronounced policies of multiculturalism to further the socioeconomic integration of
immigrants and their offspring. (..) In a counterpoint to multiculturalism's tendency
to lock migrant ethnics into their separate worlds, the goal of civic integration is
migrants' participation in mainstream institutions” (2007: 249).
Also among some Dutch scholars, thinking in terms of the Dutch multicultural
model has acquired great resonance. Koopmans (2007) roots the Dutch approach to
immigrant integration clearly in the history of pillarisation when ethno-cultural
cleavages were stressed in a similar way in multicultural policies. He claims that the
application of this model on new immigrant groups has had strong adverse effects, as
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multiculturalism “offers new ethnic and religious groups a formal and symbolic form
of equality, which in practice reinforces ethnic cleavages and reproduces segregation on
a distinctly unequal basis” (2006: 5). Koopmans points in particular to the “path-
dependency” in terms of policy practices. Although formal policy discourse and public
discourse seem to have changed, in their actual way of dealing with ethno-cultural
diversity the Dutch would have remained accommodative: “(O)rganizations and
activities based on ethnic grounds are still generously supported—directly and
indirectly—by the government. Whether people want it or not, ethnicity still plays an
important role in public institutions and discourse (Koopmans 2007: 4).”
Dutch integration policy discourse
Often when using the term multicultural model, actors such as researchers and policy
makers do this in a normative, pejorative way. The label is used to disqualify certain
policies that allegedly have been a failure. This strong empirical claim—The
Netherlands have had one static multicultural model leading to pernicious policy
measures—can easily be tested. To what extent can we indeed recognize this
multicultural model in the integration policies that have been developed over the past
decades? It turns out that The Netherlands did not develop a policy aimed at
immigrant integration until the early 1980s, when it was recognized that migrants
were to stay permanently. During the 1980s, an “Ethnic Minorities Policy” was
developed that was targeted at specific cultural or ethnic minorities in Dutch society,
such as the foreign workers, the Surinamese, the Moluccans, and the Antilleans.
Migrants were framed as “minorities” in Dutch society instead of temporary guests,
and government decided to focus on those minorities whose position was
characterized by an accumulation of cultural and social-economic difficulties and
for whom the Dutch government felt a special historical responsibility (Rath 2001).
The Minorities Policy expressed the idea that an amelioration of the social-cultural
position of migrants would also improve their social-economic position. The policy
objective was to combat discrimination and social-economic deprivation and to
support social-cultural emancipation. These policies were not developed to celebrate
all kinds of cultural differences—it did not include well-off migrants but just those
who were socio-economically very weak, and even within this category only those
ethnic groups for whom Dutch government felt a special historical responsibility.
Within this perspective, government thought the preservation of cultural identities to
be useful for instrumental reasons. At first sight, this might seem to reflect somewhat
the Dutch tradition of pluralism through “pillarism”, that is the institutionalization of
“sovereignty within the own sphere” for each minority group (Lijphart 1968). In this
context, cultural pluralism (such as broadcast media for several groups, religious
schools) was the right of Muslims like for any other group in The Netherlands. This
pluralism has, however, nothing to do with integration policies as such, but was the
consequence of the institutional heritage of pillarization.
The relation between Dutch Ethnic Minorities Policies and the history of
pillarization has, moreover, to be put in perspective. First of all, Dutch society had
been de-pillarizing in many sectors already since the 1960s and, particularly, the
1970s. Pillarization was considered as something of the past. This does not exclude,
however, that the government responded to the arrival of newcomers with, what
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Vink (2007) has called, a “pillarization reflex”: Dutch policy makers resorted to the
traditional frame of pillarization for providing meaning to the new issue of
immigrant integration. This pillarization reflex strongly resembles how in France
the Republican model was re-invented in the domain of immigrant integration in the
early 1980s Bertossi (2009).
Others have added that it was not so much the integration policy per se that was
inspired by pillarization (Maussen 2009; Duyvendak and Scholten 2009). Rather,
there was the influence of more generic institutions that were still to some extent
pillarized, such as the Dutch tradition of state-sponsored special (religious)
education, a pillarized broadcasting system and health system. Integration policy
itself has never been oriented at the construction of minority groups as pillars.
Minorities also never achieved the level of organization (and separation) that
national minorities achieved in the early twentieth century. According to Rath et al.
(1996: 59): “in terms of institutional arrangements, there is no question of an Islamic
pillar in The Netherlands, or at least one that is in any way comparable to the Roman
Catholic or Protestant pillars in the past”. In fact, we would emphasize that there
never really was a “national multicultural model”, as defining slogans as “integration
with preservation of cultural identity” were rejected already at this early stage; only
later this slogan would be projected on this period in public and academic discourse.
Pillarization nor multiculturalism were really embraced as normative ideals;
statements of multiculturalism rather referred in a more descriptive sense to the
increase of diversity in society. As far as references to pillarization or multiculturalism
were used at all (the first time multiculturalism as a term pops up in politics is in 1995!),
these seem to have beenmuchmore pragmatic than normative. Our conclusion therefore
is that “multiculturalism” is actively co-produced by politicians and social scientists in
order to disqualify policies of the past.
Besides the contested continuity between pillarisation and the alleged Dutch
multicultural model, it is also obvious that this “model” has not been very consistent
over the past decades. Since the late 1980s, the Ethnic Minorities Policy has been
subject to fierce controversy. In 1989, the authoritative Dutch Scientific Council for
Government Policy denounced this policy model, as it focused too much on “culture
and morality” and tended to make minorities too much dependent on state facilities
because of its group-specific measures (WRR 1989). According to the WRR, the
institutionalization of cultural pluralism should no longer be considered an
independent policy objective. Rather, government should focus on stimulating
individual migrants to be able to stand on their own feet. In the early 1990s,
government policy changed in several important regards. The Minorities Policy was
reframed into an Integration Policy that stressed social-economic participation of
immigrants as citizens or “allochthonous” rather than emancipation of minorities.
Promoting “good” or “active” citizenship became the primary policy goal,
stimulating individual migrants to live up to their civic rights as well as their duties
and to become economically independent participants in society.
Later, just after the turn of the millennia, an assimilationist turn took place in
Dutch integration policy. In fact, a (second) broad national debate took place in 2000
in response to claims that Dutch policy had become a “multicultural tragedy”
(Scheffer 2000). Also, the populist politician Fortuyn made the alleged failure of the
Dutch integration approach into one of his central political issues. This set in motion
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a gradual assimilationist turn, which was codified in an “Integration Policy New
Style.” Whereas the Integration Policy had stressed “active citizenship”, the
Integration Policy “New Style” stressed rather the “common citizenship”, which
meant that “the unity of society must be found in what members have in common (..)
that is that people speak Dutch, and that one abides to basic Dutch norms” (TK
2003–2004, 29203, nr. 1: 8.). Persisting social-cultural differences were now
considered a hindrance to immigrant integration. Moreover, the integration policy
was more and more linked to a broader public and political concern about the
preservation of national identity and social cohesion in Dutch society. It was in this
period that the framing of the “multicultural model” took place as a “counter-
discourse” against which new policy developments were to be juxtaposed. This
assimilationist turn may have contributed to a discursive reconstruction of the
history of integration policies that put much greater stress on its alleged
multiculturalist traits.
Clearly, there has not been one dominant model or discourse in The
Netherlands. In spite of the singular image of The Netherlands as representing
the multicultural model, Dutch policy has been inspired, beyond the multicultural
model, by at least two different discourses. One of these competing discourses is
the more liberal–egalitarian (social-economic) discourse, which became particu-
larly influential in the 1990s. And the other is the more assimilationist discourse
that emerged during the 1990s and become more prominent after the turn of the
millennia.
Policy practices
Even when we accept for the sake of argument that The Netherlands has known a
multicultural model in the 1980s, it still has to be proven that this model was also
powerful in terms of concrete policy practices. For instance, in France, there is
strong evidence of decoupling or décalage between official policy discourse (the
Republican model) and concrete policy practices which tend to be much more
lenient in terms of recognizing cultural and ethnic differences in a way that contrasts
sharply with the color-blind national policy discourse (Favell 1998).
There is some evidence that policies that were initiated in the 1980s were
effectuated in this period, and even were continued until well after the Minorities
Policy had been formally abandoned. This is what Koopmans refers to as strong
path-dependency in the practice of Dutch integration policies (2007). For instance,
Immigrant Language and Culture Instruction continued until after the turn of the
Millennia, which seem to suggest at first sight strong path-dependency. However,
upon closer examination, the picture is totally different: whereas its goal was initially
formulated as contributing to identity formation of migrants within the Dutch
society, its rationale was reframed in the 1990s in terms of “language-transition” by
first mastering the mother-tongue language as support for the subsequent
apprehension of Dutch as second language. Another practice that was continued
until well after the 1980s was the institutionalized practice of consultation with
migrant organizations. At first, the establishment of migrant organizations and a
National Consultatory and Advisory Structure for Minorities had the objective of
democratically involving migrants in policy-making processes. In the 1990s, the
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institutional involvement of migrant organizations was largely continued, although
its advisory function was gradually marginalized. More recently, an important
rationale for maintaining this form of institutionalized “multiculturalism” is that
migrant organizations provide channels for debate when incidents, such as the
murder of the film-maker Van Gogh, trigger broad public and political controversy.
Also in other fields, there are signs of some path-dependency, such as in the
existence of broadcast media for migrant groups and in the establishment of Islamic
schools with state help. However, the meaning and the use of these policies and the
opportunities offered to migrants have radically shifted over time, also because the
national and local levels of integration policy seem to have followed rather different
institutional logics. Whereas national policy discourse was inspired by politicization,
trigger events, and a concern with grand themes like national identity and culture,
local policy discourse seems to have been much more pragmatic of nature,
concerned with utilitarian modes of problem-coping and a more instrumental policy
logic.
An important instance of divergence in this respect concerns the recognition
of ethno-cultural groups and minorities organizations. In the early 1990s,
national government formally adopted a more color-blind citizenship approach,
approaching migrants as citizens rather than as ethnic or cultural groups. This
citizenship approach meant that various group-specific, tailor-made projects
would have to be abolished. Yet, in practice, there has been a continued
proliferation of such group-specific projects (De Zwart 2005). Often, there is a
pragmatic need for policy practitioners to focus on specific groups and cooperate
with migrant organizations, to be able to “reach” the policy target groups and to
acquire relevant knowledge and information about these groups (Poppelaars and
Scholten 2008).
Although these local practices often imply the de-facto recognition of cultural
groups, it would be a mistake to consider them as real multicultural policies. Rather,
they form more pragmatic attempts to conduct effective policies on the local level.
They are not inspired by an ideology of multiculturalism nor by a legacy of
pillarization, but rather by the more pragmatic need to recognize groups and develop
tailor-made projects to conduct effective policies and to, as the mayor of the City of
Amsterdam aptly phrases it, “keep things together.”
Research-policy dialogues on the Dutch model
Instead of there being one dominant discourse in The Netherlands, there were
obviously at least several competing discourses. Among them there was a “Minority
Policy Discourse” (rather recently retrospectively labeled as a “multicultural
model”), but also a more liberal–egalitarian discourse and an assimilationist
discourse. The next step is then to analyze the role that social research has played
in the evolution of this intractable policy controversy. The literature suggests that
policy development in this sector has been strongly influenced by social research
(Penninx 1992; Guiraudon 1997; Rath 2001; Scholten 2011). But, has research also
contributed to a resolution of this controversy, or has research rather become a part
of the ongoing controversies itself?
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The technocratic symbiosis of the minority policy
The Dutch Minority Policy on immigrant integration emerged as a discourse in The
Netherlands in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was the period when it had
become obvious that migrants would stay permanently and that some sort of policy
response was required. Before this period, Dutch politicians had held on firmly to
the myth of return migration, which prevented the development of an integration
policy. This also was reflected in the absence of research interest for minorities: only
few studies were done that really focused on the position of minorities within Dutch
society (Penninx 2005). In fact, government-funded research avoided the use of the
term “immigrant” (Van Amersfoort 1974) so as not to punctuate the myth of
temporary residence.
There is a clear relation between the rise of research interest and the rise of
immigrant integration on the policy agenda in the late 1970s. A powerful “discourse
coalition” emerged that consisted of a comparatively small network of policy makers
and researchers. On the side of policy and politics, there was a “gentlemen's
agreement” not to make this into a partisan issue, fearing radical parties that could
play the race card. When government had agreed that a policy for ethnic minorities
was needed, it rapidly established a departmental committee that was put in charge
of the development of such a policy. There was a strong belief among policy makers
in this period that integration as a social problem could be resolved if approached
rationally.
On the side of research, a group of researchers emerged that was brought together
in the government-sponsored Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM).
This consisted primarily of researchers with an anthropological background, which
seems to have contributed to a cultural focus in the research of the ACOM; it tended
to focus on the specific problems that minority groups faced because of their cultural
and ethnic traits. Furthermore, there was a strong sense of social engagement and
policy orientation among these researchers: they wanted their research to have a
clear societal function (Penninx 2005). In 1979, a report from the Scientific Council
for Government, which was strongly inspired and influenced by the ACOM,
provided the basis for the development of the Ethnic Minorities Policy. Most of the
recommendations from this report were silently and directly adopted in formal
policy.
This discourse coalition has been described as a technocratic symbiosis (Rath
2001), or a strongly centralized policy structure involving the co-optation of experts
and ethnic elites (Guiraudon 1997). An important function of this technocratic
symbiosis was to keep the debate on immigrant integration largely behind closed
doors; it was structurally depoliticized. This created a specific sort of “framing
dynamics” as this technocratic symbiosis was held together by a so-called
“minorities logic”, that is a focus on what was specific to minorities in terms of
culture and ethnicity rather than on their more general characteristics or what
minorities had in common with other citizens. This illustrates how this discourse
coalition not only sustained the discourse of that period, but also was itself held
together by this discourse; there was a mutually reinforcing logic between the
Minority Policy discourse and the discourse coalition by which it was sustained. At
the same time, this symbiosis effectively excluded other discourses, such as a more
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critical-Marxist discourse that had emerged in the social sciences in the 1970s and
the nationalist (assimilationist) discourse that only had very little resonance in the
field of politics in the 1980s.
Competing discourse coalitions and the role of research
The rise of the Minority Policy-frame in the 1980s was thus the outcome of
“coproduction” by researchers and policy makers that were involved in a so-called
“technocratic symbiosis.” For a considerable period (during the 1980s), this
symbiosis maintained a structural equilibrium in the field of immigrant integration.
Although many policy fields (especially social policy) were subject to major changes
in the 1980s in the context of the politics of welfare state retrenchment, the contours
of the Ethnic Minorities Policy remained largely stable. This policy “subsystem”
continued to be depoliticized and there was a belief that, especially during periods of
economic downturn like in the 1980s, there was an even greater need for specific
measures of minorities because of their strong vulnerability for economic decline. At
the same time, minorities research thrived as a rapidly growing research field that
continued to be strongly policy-oriented, among others through the Advisory
Committee on Minorities Research.
Yet, a new discourse coalition emerged at the end of the 1980s that advocated a
more social-economic approach to immigrant integration to prevent migrants from
becoming too much dependent on welfare state facilities. This discourse coalition
involved leading politicians (such as Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers, opposition
leader Frits Bolkestein) as well as experts (such as Wim Albeda, chair of the
Scientific Council for Government Policy and former minister of Social Affairs, and
Han Entzinger). Yet, this discourse coalition faced difficulties to put immigrant
integration on the agenda, especially because of its political sensitivity. Behind the
scenes, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) and the Minister of
Home Affairs, responsible for the coordination of the Ethnic Minorities Policy,
therefore agreed that the WRR would issue a new advisory report. This report would
have to focus primarily on “material areas” of integration, such as employment,
education, and housing.
This WRR report triggered broad public and also political debate in The
Netherlands. Although it did not immediately lead to policy change, the report was
revived when several years later, in 1992, a broad national Minorities Debate
emerged that effectively punctuated the norm of depoliticization and cleared the path
for policy change. Especially in its focus on active citizenship and on material areas
of integration rather than immaterial (cultural) areas, the Integration Policy that was
formulated in 1994 clearly reflected many of the ideas of the WRR from 1989. The
report triggered fierce responses from the established community of minorities
researchers. The ACOM denounced the 1989 WRR report as “a report inspired
by science rather than a scientific report” (ACOM 1989). By putting the
participation of minorities in the broader perspective of welfare state change, the
WRR had punctuated the technocratic symbiosis between researchers and policy
makers that tried to defend the established policy equilibrium by drawing attention
to what was specific to minorities rather than what they had in common with other
“citizens.”
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This episode brought an end to the institutionalized research-policy nexus that
had evolved in the 1970s and 1980s. The ACOM was dissolved in 1992, and
although minorities research continued to grow as a field of research, no similar
institute evolved that had such a central position as the ACOM. The use of social
research in policy-making became more selective and more instrumental. Penninx
(2005) describes what he calls “pick-and-choose strategies” of policy makers to
select only those strands of expertise that helped sustain the new policy discourse.
The policy setting now determined the selection of expertise. This became strikingly
clear when the WRR issued new reports on immigrant integration in 2001 and 2007,
which were inspired by international research developments (such as the emerging
transnationalist paradigm) rather than by the national policy setting (Scholten 2011).
In fact, these reports were now taken as indications that the WRR would have
become a “leftist” organization and would have become obsolete as an organization
for policy advice.
Furthermore, the utilization of research became more instrumental; government
wanted data to legitimize its new policy discourse. In this context, especially the
government-associated Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) obtained a
more prominent role. Its regular Minorities Reports were now often taken as anchor
points for policy developments, especially as the SCP addressed a lot of attention to
social-economic areas and increasingly also areas of social-cultural integration. In
fact, the role of the SCP became even more significant when it openly developed an
agenda in favor of a more assimilationist policy approach (see Schnabel 2000 and
the inclusion of parts on “social-cultural integration” in the Minorities Reports).
Just after the turn of the millennia, a new discourse emerged prominently in
Dutch politics, which stressed the need for social-cultural adaptation or assimilation.
In 2000, a second national minorities debate took place in response to an essay of the
public intellectual Paul Scheffer about “the multicultural tragedy” (Scheffer 2000).
Also, immigrant integration was the central political issue in “the long year of 2002”
that shocked Dutch politics (Andeweg and Irwin 2005). Led by Pim Fortuyn, a
broad populist movement emerged that expressed a loss of confidence in the Dutch
political establishment and its alleged ignorance towards the voice from the street.
For Pim Fortuyn, immigrant integration was the topic that illustrated the lack of
democratic responsiveness of Dutch politicians to popular concerns about cultural
tensions in society. Political concerns about immigrant integration grew further due
to a series of national and international events (11th September Attacks in the USA,
the terrorist killing of a renowned Dutch film-maker and criticaster of Islam). Also, a
number of public intellectuals (Hirsi Ali, Scheffer) continued to play a central role in
feeding public debate on immigrant integration, stressing in particular the need to
preserve Dutch identity and culture.
This new discourse was supported by a discourse coalition that consisted
primarily of politicians and public intellectuals. Initially, social research played a
rather modest role in the rise of this new discourse. The discourse coalition that
supported this new discourse carried a deep mistrust toward most social researchers
that had thus far been involved in this domain. This was manifested among others
around the publication of the 2001 and 2007 reports from the WRR. One of the
conclusions of the 2007 report was that “the” Dutch identity did not exist, which was
also aptly indicated by the Dutch princess Maxima during the press conference for
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the launch of this report. Several politicians, such as the rightist politician Wilders,
saw this as an indication of the “multicultural nonsense” from research bodies like
the WRR. The public intellectuals involved in this discourse coalition often blamed
social researchers for their “multiculturalist bias” and their policy orientation. At the
same time, these intellectuals called for a stronger political primacy in this field, in
contrast to what they saw as decades of depoliticization through venues of scientific
expertise.
These politicians and public intellectuals retrospectively labeled the past as a time
full of naive multicultural dreams, leading to a “multicultural drama”. From 2003
onwards, some well-known sociologist supported this perspective by their research,
labeling Dutch policies as a multicultural model. This proved very influential in
terms of the ex-post labeling of Dutch policies, also the liberal–egalitarian policies
from the 1990s, in terms of a multicultural model. Thereby, it clearly showed the
performative function of models-thinking in Dutch discourse on immigrant
integration.
This analysis of shifting discourses and shifting discourse coalitions shows that,
as already theorized by among others Rein and Schön and Hajer, researchers are
often part of specific discourse coalitions. Research played a key role in establishing
the Minority Policy-frame in the late 1970s, but also in setting a new discourse on
the agenda in the late 1980s, and retrospectively labeling the 1980s and 1990s as
“multicultural”. Furthermore, we can observe that whenever a change of discourse
coalition takes place, we often also see a different sort of involvement of research
emerging, often also with different researchers and research bodies involved. If
anything, this shows that the role played by scientific research is not “exceptional” in
a way as described by the standard model of science speaking truth to power
(Wildavsky 1979; Radin 2000).
Conclusions
The aim of this article was to analyze the role of social-scientific research in the
construction of the alleged Dutch “multicultural model” of immigrant integration.
Both in national and international literature, Dutch integration policies are often
described in terms of a multicultural model, which would have involved a
tendency to institutionalize cultural pluralism in the belief that cultural
emancipation of immigrant minorities is the key to their integration into Dutch
society. In this respect, the Dutch model would differ from for instance the
French (republican) model that would focus primarily on the assimilation of
migrants into the French political community regardless of cultural or ethnic
origins of migrants.
This article, first of all, strongly nuances the idea that there would be a dominant
Dutch multicultural model of integration. At best, it was one of several discourses;
beyond multiculturalism, liberal–egalitarianism and assimilationism have also been
powerful discourses in The Netherlands. In fact, when it comes to official policy
discourse, the Minority Policy-frame was abandoned already in the early 1990s, and
there is evidence that, even during the 1980s, this Dutch policy discourse was much
less “multicultural” than often suggested by politicians and some scholars.
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Moreover, many practices were actually not inspired by a normative belief in
multiculturalism but by more pragmatic concerns of “keeping things together.”
Social-scientific research played a central role in the development of the Minority
Policy-frame in the late 1970s and during the 1980s. A technocratic symbiosis that
brought together a small network of policy makers and researchers allowed for the
development this policy “behind closed doors.” Research also played a role in
punctuating this symbiosis and the agenda-setting of a new type of (liberal–
egalitarian) discourse in the late 1980s. In both episodes, social researchers formed a
central part of the discourse coalitions that sustained either the Minority Policy-
frame in the 1980s or liberal egalitarianism in the 1990s. However, some researchers
also played a role in the discourse coalition that triggered the assimilationist turn in
Dutch policy discourse after the turn of the millennia. Though the assimilationist
turn was associated with growing cynicism toward social research, soon sociologists
joined the “realist” discourse coalition (Prins 2004) by retrospectively labeling
Dutch integration policies as “multiculturalist”. Obviously, this is a rather specific
form of coproduction of policy makers and scholars: it is the invention of a tradition
(the invention of Dutch multiculturalism) that produced the legitimacy for the
assimilationist turn in Dutch integration politics.
This analysis shows that researchers often tend to be part of specific discourse
coalitions: they too adopt specific normative models for naming and framing social
reality. Rather than policy models being verified or falsified by research, we can
speak of the coproduction of policy models by researchers and policy makers. The
case-study of Dutch integration policies clearly show in this respect that, within the
strongly national setting in which these policies are developed, researchers and
policy makers tend to coproduce “national models of integration”, be it the (anti-)
multicultural model or the more liberal–egalitarian model of civic integration.
Similar observations have been made for France, where researchers (and
intellectuals) and policy makers have “co-produced” various versions of “the”
republican model of integration (Bertossi 2009). There is, however, one big
difference between the two countries: whereas the Dutch multicultural model has
retrospectively been framed as a negative point of reference, in France republicanism
and ‘Laicité’ still have strong positive connotations (Bertossi and Duyvendak 2009).
Very recently, prominent politicians in Germany start to label their past as
“multiculti” as well—and like the most vocal voices in The Netherlands, this is
meant in a pejorative way.
Especially in the case of intractable controversies like immigrant integration, the
coproduction of such national models of integration may in fact hinder our
understanding of integration processes. As this case-study has shown, the Dutch
case is characterized by at least several discourses or “models of integration.” Every
discourse has its own way of naming and framing integration, and its own criteria for
determining policy success or failure. Such a multiplicity of discourses complicates
research-policy dialogues; what some see as evidence of policy success, may be seen
by others as irrelevant or even evidence of policy failure. This way research-policy
dialogues that do not manage to achieve the level of “critical frame reflection” may
decay into a “dialogue of the deaf.”
Therefore, there is a need for research-policy dialogues that allow for reflection
based on at least several discourses or “models of integration.” One way to achieve
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this is to develop more inductive empirical research to integration processes. Instead
of adopting a specific discourse as a starting point of research (for instance, research
on the success or failure of Dutch policies), inductive research can strive to take as
many problem aspects into account (based on an exploration of various discourses),
and then reason towards different discourses. This also means that research in itself
can never determine the success or failure of a specific policy.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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